[ 01. ] Segment
Wallets that carry their own provenance


Wallet control, routed execution and portfolio records, with a privacy pool between them. Every privacy claim Helix makes is conditional, specific to a mechanism, and explicit about what it does not cover. It starts with the fact that trading at a public venue is visible whether or not you shield around it.
Prototype · illustrative figures · nothing shown is live
The suite
Each part is a function of the same suite, not a separate brand. They share one wallet layer, one policy surface and one set of records, so the boundaries between them are defined rather than assumed.
[ 01. ] Segment


[ 02. ] Shield


[ 03. ] Trade


[ 04. ] Observe

Prototype · illustrative figures · nothing shown is live
How it works
The privacy pool sits in the middle of a longer sequence. Everything before it and everything after it is ordinary, visible on-chain activity. The table below sets out each stage and what is visible at it.
USDC arrives from a wallet or exchange you already use. Helix reads the address and asks that wallet to sign; it never holds the key.
Wallet A deposits into the pool. A commitment is written on-chain; the note that lets you spend it is created on your device and stays there.
Deposits accumulate behind yours. Helix does not describe a position as ready before the set of deposits it could plausibly have come from is worth entering.
A proof generated on your device spends the note to a fresh wallet. A relayer submits the transaction, so Wallet B needs no prior funding of its own. The withdrawal also grants it a small, fixed amount of SOL so it can transact afterwards.
Wallet B funds a trading venue. The trading itself is ordinary trading, conducted at a third-party venue under that venue's own rules.
Proceeds return to the pool and later exit to a third wallet, separating the trading history from where the value comes to rest.
The boundary
The flow sounds as though it wraps the trading. It does not. Trading happens at a public venue and is attributable there, whether you shield before it, after it, or both. What shielding conceals is which deposit a withdrawal came from. That is a narrower and more useful claim than the one people expect.
We state this because the broader claim would be inaccurate. The scope of every other claim on this site is set out on the same basis.
Execution
Helix runs the privacy pool and the client. It does not run a trading venue. Orders go to third-party venues, and the venue that carried an order is named wherever that order appears. Each venue is listed below with the property that matters most: whether it can be funded from the pool without leaving Solana, and what it can see.
| Venue | Used for | Shielded funding path | What the venue records |
|---|---|---|---|
| Jupiter | Spot routing on Solana | On path | Every swap, per address, publicly and permanently. |
| Aster | Perpetuals | On path | Every order and position, attributable to the trading account. |
| Hyperliquid | Perpetuals | Off path | Every order and position. It settles outside Solana, so it is funded transparently from a linked wallet and no privacy claim attaches to it at all. |
Where this stands
Helix is in specification and review. The design decisions below are settled and recorded. The code that would implement them is not written, not audited and not deployed, and this site will say so until each of those changes.
The reason to publish at this stage is that the commitments on the trust and recovery pages are only worth anything if they are made before there is money at stake.
“An exit path documented only on a site we operate is not an exit path.” Helix Exit Path Specification · HXS-SPC-007 §7